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1. Machine learning, its rise and nature 
 
The preceding three decades have seen the emergence, rise, and proliferation of machine 
learning (ML). From half-recognised beginnings in perceptrons, neural nets, and decision trees, 
algorithms that extract correlations (that is, patterns) from a set of data points have broken free 
from their origin in computational cognition to embrace all forms of problem solving, from voice 
recognition to medical diagnosis to automated scientific research and driverless cars, and it is 
now widely opined that the real industrial revolution lies less in mobile phone and similar than in 
the maturation and universal application of ML. Among the consequences just might be the 
triumph of anti-realism over realism. 
 
A venerable and widely familiar example of an ML tool is a so-called neural net. The neural net 
learning algorithm in simple form involves procedures for representing inputs (data points) as 
loads on net-input layer nodes. These loads are then redistributed across nodes of the next layer 
according to a weighting formula on node connections. This redistributing operation is repeated 
on successive internal layers until the last (output) layer is reached. Various node connection 
weightings are trialled on a training data set until the net yields the appropriate outputs (until it 
has learned its task) and then it can be applied predictively to further, related data sets. In this 
fashion nets have learned many tasks easily that continue to be difficult and sometimes 
impossible for humans. However, only the initial (input or setup) and last (output) layers are 
cognitively interpretable; in general, the remainder cannot be assigned any cognitively 
meaningful state. Just this is the secret of their success. The net learning algorithm specifies the 
states of internal nodes and the functions that change them numerically, not logically, so that net 
processing is sub-categorical with respect to the input and output psychological categories. The 
output content is not arrived at from the input by any process of concept-preserving logical 
analysis. Rather, just this shift greatly increases accessible net states and state change functions. 
Using nets involves rejecting the long and widely-held assumption of adhering to agency 
categories when constructing psychological theory.1 
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Neural nets are not the only ML algorithms—the overview Wikipedia entry lists 50+ forms (see 
n. 1). Other ML algorithms are based on quite different methods that do not have the same 
(mostly false) biological motivation. But they do highlight one challenging feature widely (but 
not universally) shared among such algorithms: the absence of interpretability for their internal 
states. This absence can also extend to their outputs as well, if, for example, the output, and the 
internal states, are expressed as an infinite dimensional vector. Nonetheless, when the data sets 
concern the behaviour of entities under study, the algorithms deliver, via their estimated 
correlation relationships, predictions of entity behaviour as accurate as the data set permits and, 
as the data set increases, accuracy as high as any model could achieve. Note again that a learning 
algorithm will produce “naked predictions,” that is, numbers stripped of any ontological 
interpretation: it is not that they present a different ontological interpretation, or that one will 
appear once the data are “cleaned up”; they offer none at all. Their predictive success combined 
with their a-ontolological status stands at the heart of the challenge they pose to realism.  
 
2. Machine Learning supports the centrality of a-model naked prediction 
 
The usual context in which prediction is discussed in philosophy of science is one where 
predictions are derived by deduction from initial data conjoined to some theoretical model that is 
interpreted (realized) in terms of that theory’s ontology, whether that be atomic or field, 
dynamical or functional, etc. When such a model is not available, neither is prediction. But there 
are myriad cases where this requirement is not satisfied, where we can determine that the system 
has changed but there is no satisfactory interpreted model of how that happens. Examples 
include processes too complex to follow, as occurs in complex systems where dynamical form 
may transform, and critical and chaotic regimes arise, and/or data too vast for humans to 
comprehend, as occurs with increasing frequency (in big business, in bio-molecular science, 
etc.). ML offers naked prediction in every case, whether or not those predictions also follow 
from an interpreted model, and is often our only way to advance research and understanding.  
 
Given this, naked prediction seems more central to science than modelling does. Why not then 
accept that science is based solely on naked prediction, ignore the call to understand the 
theoretical world beyond this as a siren call, and argue that the diverse goals of science 
(prediction, explanation, unification, etc.) can all be parsed in terms of naked predictive 
performance alone? Note that this is not a proposal to remove this or that class of models, but 
rather the claim that it is not necessary to use theoretical models at all, indeed not necessary to 
use theory at all (Breiman 2001). And with that goes any claim that science guides choice of 
ontology. The centrality of a-model naked prediction is by default an anti-realist position. 
 
The only commitments to human-scale empirical elements (input and outcome data, measuring 
instruments, etc.), are those required by a recurring phenomenological empiricism. ML still 
requires a human to identify a prediction task, choose a competent ML algorithm, specify 
relevant inputs and outputs, and procure adequate training and an experimental data set. These 
are not at present interpretation-free activities, which raises the prospect that ML illegitimately 
smuggles in interpretive models.2 Some entertain finessing the problem by use of all possible 
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3. History of this cleavage 
 
Science has been constantly faced with this issue. It is, for example, the motivating division 
behind those who, a century and more ago, pushed for a science of psychology founded on 
revealing the inner structure and contents of minds (e.g., Wundt) and those who urged 
confinement to just extracting patterns within stimuli and responses (e.g., Skinner). But back 
then it was a matter of high philosophical differences that carried the debate. Now the 
development of ML forces this issue in an immediate, unavoidable way. The wheel has also 
turned full circle: Skinnerian empiricism was replaced by computational cognitivism’s quasi-
internalist modelling, only to be challenged in turn by ML’s externalist agnosticism. More 
broadly, this methodological difference is the deepest expression of the realist/anti-realist 
cleavage that runs through the philosophy of science.3 
 
4. The central question and its answer 
 
Is science satisfactorily characterizable in terms of prediction alone (“naked prediction”) or is 
there something more that is essential to science? A second question follows: By what criteria 
ought the preceding question be decided? A popular but reasonable response to this latter 
question is that any additional end proposed for science ought to “pay its way,” i.e., to add 
something that is valuable independently of the value that naked prediction brings. Naked 
prediction serves the inherent epistemic value of naked pattern knowledge, and with that naked 
explanation, and also the pragmatic value of control, we can manipulate the world (including 
ourselves) to achieve various pragmatically valuable ends from engaging in research to building 
bridges and curing maladies.  
 
What then of any ends of science beyond what prediction supports? The most compelling 
answer, we suggest, is the provision of an intelligible conception of deep or underlying being 
(ontology). What sort of being or beings is the cosmos? How does it work? How are living 
beings constituted as living? What are their ends (if any) inherent in their being? These and 
related questions are all central to our personal and collective drive for enlightenment. If 
anything beyond manipulative or naked pattern knowledge has inherent value, it is ontological 
enlightenment. This notion is tied to theoretically interpretable ontology, and hence to realist 
interpretable modelling.  
 
5. Supports, persuasive and not, for interpretable modelling 
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Simplicity. Might simplicity considerations support interpretable modelling? ML is vulnerable to 
an Occam’s razor-type argument in that its models are more complex than needed if an 
interpretable model will do the job. But the prediction-alone approach equally avoids 
commitment to any ontological categories beyond the empirical phenomena of experimentation, 
etc. noted above and in any case these categories are shared with interpretable modelling. And 
with that, the prediction-alone approach also avoids evaluating theory coherency, historical 
sequences of theories that might support realism, and much more (cf. n. 3). Moreover, as input-
output data increases, the ML output converges on the predictions of a true model, any 
differences of predictive accuracy go away and any differences in output simplicity go with 
them. That is, arguments about simplicity (or, for instance, Popperian falsifiability criteria) are 
tacitly predicated. Our conclusion is that simplicity is too complex, so it does not produce a 
useful test.  
 
Risk. ML similarly cannot convincingly claim that it takes on less risk than does interpretable 
modelling (or vice versa). While ML’s prediction-only approach avoids the ontological risks of 
error noted above, it still risks using an inadequate method to resolve small differences between 
predictions by not including relevant input sets and/or by not having sufficient internal 
discrimination (e.g., a neural net with too few nodes per layer) or by having insufficient or noisy 
data. (This is the problem faced in §2.) However, lacking any guidance from what is there (being 
ontologically non-commital), the only option available is to include all possible input data to an 
infinitely internally diverse algorithm and to trust it will remove the risks. These requirements 
are certainly in principle beyond practical realization, especially for finite beings that commence 
in ignorance and remain fallible, but is such an algorithm nonetheless in principle able to do the 
job if realized? We suppose not, but leave the question open.4 Either way, our conclusion is that 
risk is also too complex, so it does not produce a useful test.  
 
Efficiency. Interpretable models provide important categories of information that ML cannot in 
principle provide, and interpretable models provide it in immediately intelligible and usable 
forms. In general, interpretable models tell us about the states and processes that studied systems 
exhibit, while ML can only characterize input-output relationships. I can transfer the force that 
holds our solar system together, found out from its correlational data, to any other solar system 
without alteration, and so start working out its physics immediately. However, it will be replied, 
whenever practical use is to be made of this information, whether for astro- or astrodome 
physics, it always suffices directly to use the relevant input-output relationships. If so, the 
intermediary details are merely one way to arrive at the outputs but are no more essential to 
doing so than are the particular internal details of a competent ML algorithm. Thus far our 
preference for interpretable details is just that: an affectation or cultural habit that does no 
independent work. 
 
There is this further consideration. An interpretable model comes with a framework of dynamical 
modalities: possibility, actuality, necessity, including super-possibilities and super-necessities for 
how they may change their specific versions of these, for example under bifurcations. What a 
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(impossible, necessary, etc.) is straightforward. 
fundamental theory of physics primarily tells us is what the dynamical possibilities and 
necessities are in some domain, and the rest is input-output relations (called flows or vector 
fields). ML algorithms, being confined to naked data and their relationships, cannot in principle 
provide the modal information.5 But again comes the response that, while modality may make it 
easier for us to make predictions, it is also unnecessary for that. Like our interest in states and 
processes, our interest in modality is just that: a pragmatic preference deriving from ease of 
human use when that was an important consideration, perhaps, but not a distinction that does any 
independent work. But before acquiescing, note one potential sticking point: some complex 
dynamical systems show bifurcation, a sharp change in dynamical form itself that amounts to 
change in what is dynamically possible and necessary, and that raises the question of whether 
ML can adequately characterize these changes (with whatever internal discriminators it uses). 
There may be reason to think not, and if so we have one ineliminable functional argument for 
retaining interpretable models in addition to their inherent value for us.6  
 
Unification. The value of ontological understanding is supported, we contend, by the partial but 
deep successes of a closely-related scientific end: theoretical unification. A unification requires 
provision of a single unifying ontology, thus driving ontological understanding deeper through 
transformation of the possibility-necessity framework. The unification of electromagnetic and 
mechanical dynamics to form relativity theory provides a deep revelation of our spatiotemporal 
being in the world. Again the currently-developing unification of biological chemistry and 
quantum macromolecular theory will provide a deep understanding of living beings. And so on. 
However, following the preceding indecisiveness, we must ask whether machine learning can 
again provide all the relevant input-output relationships. If machine learning is presumed to have 
no limitations to its capacity to form these relationships, it will develop input-output 
representations of systems that are pre-unification and systems that are post-unification, but of 
course as naked inputs and outputs, not characterized in interpretable ontological terms. Again, 
there is nothing further needed for the use of the predictions. (There remains their inherent value 
for us.) However, most or all of these inter-theory relations are specified in terms of asymptotic 
relations (1/c -> 0, h -> 0, etc.) and these also involve indefinitely fine discriminations, so the 
preceding doubt (n. 6) remains.  
 
6. Realism in a partially accessible world.  
 
We live in a world that quickly becomes epistemically inaccessible to us beyond the simplest 
systems. We may know bare Newton’s equations, but when joined with specific interactions and 
constraints for actual use, the equations quickly become insoluble in algebraic functions beyond 
their simpler forms. This bars our way to interpretable knowledge of them. But since we know 
the equations we can in principle acquire a lesser but still interpretable knowledge of them by 
numerically approximating their states in sequence beginning from initial inputs. Since we are 
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are finite and so must generate rounding-off errors. Thus dynamical processes that generate large changes from 
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consider this argument final, but this is not the place to pursue the issue and it is anyway likely premature to do so at 
this juncture. 
not in general able to infer parametric models from these data, or even much (though not no) 
knowledge of possibility and necessity, this is not very different from pure input-output 
knowledge. (The exception is that the basic components [this lever, those atoms, etc.] will be 
interpretively known throughout, so long as they are not dissipated by the dynamics.) But this is 
not the only part-way house of knowledge that can arise. Suppose, for example, that Newton 
could not deduce the gravitational principle that held the solar system together, but had access to 
ML to apply to astronomical data. Suppose that he could isolate the samenesses and differences 
in the internal ML states corresponding to a variety of planets and moons. What could he learn? 
The inverse square law? No. This is not because the states are naked (we want the spatial pattern, 
not its ontology), but because what could easily, and would likely, appear is a very complex set 
of numerical interrelationships taking perhaps hundreds of pages to print out, and making for a 
wholly uninterpretable, hence inaccessible, representation of gravity. But while we cannot make 
use of it, the ML device can.  
 
Realists need interpretable access to dynamics. They can simply choose to live within the limits, 
often quite severe limits, on this access, pragmatically constructing interpretable models 
whenever possible. But while this may be a valid policy for the setting,7 the preceding 
considerations raise again the issue of what the criteria are for interpretable models. Are they 
simply the entities and relations that we humans find sufficiently convenient to use, say because 
of the way our perception and action has evolved? Or is there something more species-
transcending (and so objective) behind their characterization? Suppose a Martian were to claim, 
as someday an ML robot might, that it was comfortable employing the hundreds-of-pages 
conception of gravity. Does it have an interpretable model? Where does it leave our notion of an 
interpretable model? It is not enough to say that it is what a theory quantifies over. This only 
shifts the question back to what constitutes an intelligible theory. Is it one that quantifies over 
entities intelligible to us?8 These questions loom larger than this issue, reaching out to 
considerations of how diversity in cognitive capacities ought to bear upon accounts of 
objectivity, adequate translation, and so on. Yet they are also relevant here, since ML bids fair to 
being a domain of distinctive cognitive capacities that is destined to expand and deepen, and to 
intertwine itself with us in myriad ways.   
 
7. Conclusion 
 
The inherent value of an ontological description remains, for us, a compelling defence of 
realism. However, access to it is limited, and successful naked prediction challenges traditional 
conceptions of the scientific method and philosophy of science, whether realist or not. We expect 
these challenges to grow as machine learning presents an alternative to an ever-wider variety of 
tasks, resulting in a mode of scientific advance that is alien to our present philosophical 
conceptions. This will change the terms of the realist debate and many others. 
 
                                                          
7 This is where one of us [CAH] left the discussion in a first essay into the domain (Hooker 2011) despite the 
informal efforts of the other [GJH]. 
8 Compare the variety of conceptions of model interpretability as some form of intuitability that Lipton (2016) 
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